Power has played a significant role in the motivation of scientific progress,
specifically in comparing modern science and ancient science. Power-seekers
have been greatly attracted to scientific pursuits, seeking monetary, life-giving
or glory-earning ends. In ancient science "the lure of health, wealth,
and eternal life charmed many an alchemist to the poorhouse, madness, or
an untimely death" (Coudert 35), while modern society itself has embraced
scientific development with a similar fervor.
Amidst many similarities, the rift between ancient and modern science is
enormous and has frequently left historians puzzled. Although it is clear
to historians that the stagnant science of ancient times developed into
the modern scientific pursuit in the 17th century, it is not clear what
specifically caused this revolution of scientific thought.
This essay will discuss differences in motives which have driven ancient
and modern science, arguing that 17th century alterations of power structures
led to the ultimate division between modern and ancient science and the
eruption of modern science as it is today. Comparisons will be drawn regarding
knowledge accessibility, prevailing philosophies and ideologies, and the
relationship between science and the church.
To begin, a major shift in scientific thinking arrived with the dawn of
the printing press and the new-found accessibility of knowledge. "Alchemy
was from its origins a secret art;" (Roberts 66) secrecy was an absolute
necessity in early science when a powerful recipe or method had been discovered,
as such knowledge was a valuable commodity. Prior to the development of
patents and publications, any unguarded, valuable scientific information
could be pilfered by a jealous neighbor or friend. "Economic realities
compelled craftsmen to keep the secrets of the arts guarded from public
view" (Eamon 81). There was in fact, no motive which would encourage
experimenters to share their attained knowledge with others; sharing knowledge
gave the power of the knowledge to another person who could take credit
for someone else's discovery or use the knowledge to his or her advantage.
It is not surprising that ancient scientists recorded their successful recipes
and experiments using cryptic, allegorical methods, as a further accessibility-limiting
tactic. "There is a strong tradition in Western thought that important
truths are most properly expressed in a veiled, obscure or difficult way"
(Roberts 67). Such valuable and powerful knowledge was recorded in allegorical
sketches, prose, woodcuttings stories and songs. "One of the things
that sharply divides alchemy from chemistry is that from the earliest times
the instructions for practical craft operations and chemical processes went
hand in hand with figurative expression and elaborate metaphorical language"
(66). This information was powerful because "the message implicit in
the literature of secrets was that nature was power-laden and that this
power could be exploited by those who knew, by experience, its secrets"
(Eamon 79).
With the dawn of 17th-century rationalism, the allegorical language of ancient
science quickly became outdated. "The notion of speaking in riddles
and veiling truth in 'mystie speech' seemed less appealing to an age characterized
by a tremendous zeal for reform in all areas of life - science, medicine,
politics, religion, education, language and agriculture" (Coudert 207).
Meanwhile, the printing press brought emphasis to the written language and
spread literature to the world in general.
Science now had the motive it needed to develop the community of scientists;
the developments of scientific journals and patents shifted power from those
who kept secrets to those who told secrets. Science was able to build its
community collection of knowledge, and a tremendous potential awaited the
development of science. "Once alchemy came out of the closet and alchemists
openly communicated their discoveries to other alchemists, the stage was
set for the tremendous advances we have come to expect from the natural
sciences" (Coudert 211).
Secondly, the dawn of rationalism contributed further to the rift between
ancient and modern science. Early science was rooted in mysticism and magic.
"Alchemists were larger than life. An aura of magic, mystery and wizardry
clung to their activities" (Coudert 77). Ancient scientists' inability
to explain chemical phenomena gave their profession a mysterious and magical
power. "Until men could accurately describe what they were doing and
begin to understand their own magic, they were unable to explain their failures
and attributed them to recalcitrant forces in matter itself, in the heavens,
in the environment or in themselves" (72). Such unexplainable events
instilled fear to both the onlooker and the scientist and therefore gave
power to the experimenter; "[alchemists] dazzled themselves with their
power to transform matter into new forms, shapes, smells and colors"
(145).
Interestingly, with the arrival of the Age of Reason, magic temporarily
gained influence because of the potential material gain which magical experimentation
could generate. "Magic responded to a new intellectual climate developing
in Western Europe in the late Middle Ages; the growing emphasis on the idea
that knowledge could be exploited for practical gain" (Eamon 75). Nevertheless,
philosophers such as Francis Bacon were arguing for the application of methodical
science and a scientific method (Brown 6), while societal interest in science
was increasing. "European thought emerged from the Middle Ages, shook
off a belief in magic and the intellectual authority of the church [and]
reasserted the power and potentialities of human initiative and reason"
(101). This shift in focus marked a significant change in scientific attitude
over a short period of time. "Seventeenth century science could be
seen as a mathematical and mechanical manifestation of the same impulses
expressed in magical and animist philosophers of nature in the preceding
century" (Copenhauer 263).
And yet it was this scientific, methodical approach to science which led
to science's institutional success. "One could say that it is precisely
because science works, for example, that it allows us to develop new technologies,
that we know it must be correct" (Yearley 22). This success which resulted
in material gain and wealth, came at a time when society's interests turned
toward humanity with the popularization of 17th century humanitarianism
.
Furthermore, science's truth claims, "objectivity" and usefulness
led to its authority (46). These claims, which argue the impartiality, objectivity
and truth of science, combined with the service of science toward practical
ends, resulted in overwhelming societal support for the pursuit of science,
which has continued to the present. "'Science' and 'scientist' have
been the most legitimate knowledge labels in North American society since
the turn of the century. During this century, the primary route for increasing
power and raising the status of knowledge has been to make it scientific"
(Fisher 99).
A third significant change, regarding societyís popular perception,
helped to increase the growing rift between ancient science and modern science.
Ancient science, and ancient intellectualism in general, looked to the past
for answers to the present; "the history of alchemy is similar to other
mythic constructions in Western culture of a golden age of knowledge, religion,
science, poetry or music: knowledge was always perfect or at least fuller
or more pristine in the distant past" (Roberts 13). It therefore was
the responsibility of the scientist to delve into ancient books and accounts,
in search for the mysterious answers to the world. Experimental determination
of knowledge was not carried out by these scholars; in fact, laboratory
experiments were only conducted by unschooled wizards. Hence, the scholarly
scientific knowledge of the day was not attained by experimental observation
but rather by theoretical reasoning. "Scholars spent much of their
time interpreting and comparing texts in old books and, in the case of natural
sciences, trying to reconcile what they read with the works of ancient authorities
such as Aristotle or Galen" (Brown 1).
Humanity believed that the world had passed its peak and that all valuable
knowledge would be attained from the past; "the pursuit of science
was not so much a bold adventure into the unknown as a search in the library
for something which was already known and written down in the past"
(1). Moreover, it was this view of knowledge which gave power to antiquity.
Again, with the arrival of the Age of Reason, society's emphasis moved from
the past to the future, supporting the idea of progress, which asserted
the idea that science was moving in a general upward trend of knowledge
accumulation, where knowledge can be increased over time with hard work
(Brown 6). "The position of . . . the defenders of ancient superiority
simply lost its plausibility in the glare of 18th century optimism about
the advancement of civilization. . . . This historiographic void was filled
by the idea of progress, based on faith in the development and application
of human reason" (Lindberg 6). Society no longer believed that humanity
had passed its "golden age" of knowledge but instead gained a
new perspective, finding modern society more fortunate than previous societies
as heirs to all knowledge that has previously been discovered (Brown 7).
Society viewed modern science as the key to the future and such assertions
contributed further to scientific power and influence.
Finally, a drastic change in the relationship between the church and academia
also intensified the gap between ancient and modern science. Ancient and
particularly medieval science was limited exclusively by the church; the
church maintained an enormous influence over education, and as nearly all
of the laity were illiterate, the church could control the accessibility
of information (Yearley 52). Early science was viewed with suspicion by
the church, who believed that science lent to vanity, pride and biblical
fallacy, and therefore restricted the range of scientific knowledge; "the
possibility of scientists and a scientific worldview rising to cultural
authority was hindered by clerical pre-eminence" (52). The majority
of the scholars were clergy, monks and university staff and therefore placed
an emphasis upon theological pursuits rather than scientific objectives.
"It was the course of religion, not science, which really interested
the learned world" (Brown 2).
Not only did the church hold such a constrictive grip in knowledge, but
their analyses of knowledge were largely biased and arbitrary. According
to these "Scholastics" of the church, "'facts' were the data
reported or confirmed by the litterati (those who wrote Latin for a scholarly
audience) while 'superstitions' were the data that circulated among the
illitterati (identified with oral and vernacular traditions)" (Eamon
55). Furthermore, the church strongly discouraged any scientific development
which contradicted the teachings of the church. The church labeled certain
research, such as anatomical studies of the heart, which was the spiritual
center of the body, or the study of the origin of the earth, as heretical
because of their religious implications, thus squelching these endeavors.
Bacon and his counterparts did not have much patience for the church's limited
and capricious approach to science. In fact, the church had reason to be
suspicious of the growing scientific movement. "Apprehensions about
science's unorthodoxy were not just the hysterical reactions of religious
conservatives; they had real grounds. The potentially atheistic implications
of the mechanical philosophy were apparent to all observers" (Eamon
322). Academics became suspicious about the churchís academic superiority,
while gaining interest in the pursuit of rational science; "the humanist
scholars of the Renaissance were more interested in Man and this world than
in God and the next world" (Brown 4). Most importantly, scholars began
to draw significant distinctions between religion and science, condemning
religion because of its lack of objectivity and reason. "Science is
empirical and verifiable, whereas religion is, at best, of value as an emotional
support; where religion is dogmatic, science is skeptical; and science is
objective and disinterested, while religion has a subjective attraction"
(Yearley 52). It follows that such legitimization of science led to its
modern triumph over religion.
Similarly, ancient science retained its connections with the humanities
while modern science emphasized the differences between scientific pursuit
and other disciplines, both to power-gaining ends. The ancient sciences
emphasized unity of all knowledge and connected itself with a variety of
disciplines, specifically relating to religion. Read explains:
Alchemy was indeed a vast network in which the sparse strands of rudimentary
chemistry were interwoven with threads derived from ancient and later religions,
folklore, mythology, astrology, magic, mysticism, philosophy, theosophy,
and other wide fields of human imagination and experience (14).
Conversely, modern science rejected these ties with other forms of knowledge
as the tide of rationalism swept the West. "In a century in England
which saw the divisions of church and state, king and commons, king and
parliament, so arts and sciences and branches of knowledge begin to go different
ways and become distinct" (Roberts 93).
Rationalism and reason characteristically categorized systems according
to logical, organized divisions. Hence, this separation of science and the
humanities can be viewed as a natural manifestation of the Renaissance.
Nevertheless, even this new aspect of science did not escape power motives.
One tactic of legitimization involves the creation of ideologies in order
to pursue oneís own interests (Yearley 51). Science has indeed developed
its own power-seeking ideologies; "one particular use of such ideologies
. . . is to erect divisions between science and other competing institutional
bases of knowledge" (51). Science therefore legitimized itself by emphasizing
truth claims of science while also delineating empirical differences which
set science apart from other intellectual pursuits.
In conclusion, ancient and modern science parted ways with the dawn of 17th-century
rationalism and the Renaissance. Significant changes in the power structures
of the prevailing society led to an upheaval of the medieval status quo
which, in turn, led to revolutionary reform in not only the sciences but
in academia in general, as well as in politics, religion and social organization.
Herbert Butterfield enthusiastically wrote:
Since [the Scientific R]evolution overturned the authority in science not
only of the middle ages but of the ancient world . . . it outshines everything
since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation
to the rank of mere episodes, mere displacements, within the system of medieval
Christiandom (Lindberg 1).
However, it was in fact the culmination of the Renaissance and 17th-century
ideals which largely contributed to the evolution of scientific pursuit,
altering the power motives of knowledge accessibility, philosophical and
ideological trends, and the relationship of science with the church.
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